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Abstract
We consider a monopoly facing a differentiated unit demand where consumers value
quality of goods and incur transportation costs. We show the monopoly can oversupply
quality contrary to classic models of vertically differentiated unit demand, because here,
demand is globally elastic.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the optimal choice of quality by a monopoly. We consider a monopoly
facing a differentiated demand where consumers value quality of goods and incur transportation
costs.
Numerous papers deal with the problem of quality choice by a monopoly. In models where
consumers buy at most one unit of a good (unit demand), the results on the quality chosen
by the monopoly mainly differ with respect to the assumption on market coverage. When
the market is fully covered (i.e. whatever the choice of qualities by the monopoly, the total
production remains constant), then the monopoly undersupplies quality as compared with the
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choice of a social planner. Conversely, when the market is not covered, there is no distorsion
in the qualities offered.
Thus, when the market is fully covered, in a pure model of vertical differentiation and with
the same assumptions as ours regarding to density and costs, Spence (1975) and Lambertini
(1998) have shown that a monopoly producing a finite number of qualities undersupplies quality
as compared to the social planner1. Mussa and Rosen (1978) obtained the same result with an
infinite number of qualities. Recently Rochet and Stole (1999) in a context with both horizon-
tal and vertical differentiation show that monopoly undersupplies quality as compared with the
social planner choice but in a lower extent than in a pure vertical differentiation model. On the
contrary, in a context where market is not fully covered, Lambertini (1998) showed that with
a finite number of qualities, the monopoly does not distort quality. Distortion as compared to
the social planner choice only affects prices.
Spence (1975) gave the two relevant effects explaining the monopoly quality level compared
to the first best one:
• the monopoly has incentive to undersupply quality if the valuation of quality for the
average consumer is higher than the one of the marginal consumer;
• the relation between quality and the extent to which the firm restricts quantity due to
market power.
In this paper, where the unit demand is differentiated horizontally and vertically, we show
that the monopoly can oversupply quality. The double differentiation adds one more degree
of freedom in the demand making its price-elasticity higher than in classic model of vertical
differentiation. Even if the average consumer valuation of quality is higher than the marginal
consumer one, because the demand is globally elastic the monopoly oversupplies quality in
order to capture a higher share of the social welfare by restricting quantities sold. The result
that the monopoly oversupplies quality does not usually occur in models with a unit demand,
but in frameworks where consumers can buy several units of the good (due to this assumption,
demand is more elastic).
The next section presents the framework and the demand. Section 3 studies the first best
optimum, whereas section 4 analyzes the quality choice of the monopoly when he sells only one
product and compares it to the first best one. Section 5 concludes.
1See also Gabszewicz & Thisse (1986) and Shaked & Sutton (1982) for a discussion on the finiteness property.
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2 The demand
Consumers are located along a segment of size 1 and buy at most one unit of a good. When
they buy a product of quality q at price p, their utility is classically modeled by:
U(θ, x) = θq − p− tx (1)
where θ is the marginal utility for quality and t is defined as the transportation cost from
the consumer location (x) to the retailer located at 0 (it can also be interpreted as a valuation
of an outside good differing across consumers). We assume that θ ∈ [0, θ = 1] and is uniformly
distributed on this segment, x ∈ [0, L = 1]. For this reason, consumers do not perceive the good
in a identical way as they differ in their taste for quality (parameter θ) and in their location
relative to the retailer where the good is sold (parameter x). The good is therefore horizontally
and vertically differentiated.
The firm selling the good is a monopoly located at x = 0, producing the good of quality q
with a quadratic unit cost function defined by: c(q) = 1
2
q2. The marginal cost is thus constant
in quantity2, but marginal cost on quality is increasing, and convex. This monopoly decides
the quality of the good and the price charged to consumers.
The frontier on θ defining consumers located at x who are indifferent between buying one
unit of the good of quality q or not buying at all are characterized by U(θ0(x), x) = 0, that is:
θ0(x) =
p+ tx
q
(2)
The consumer of type θ = 1 and indifferent for consumption is then such that θ0(x) = 1.
Its location, denoted by x is defined by:
x =
q − p
t
(3)
Therefore, two cases may appear according to the behavior of the consumer characterized
by θ = 1 and located at x = 1 (that is the location of x relative to 1). Situation (A) is defined
by the fact such consumer has no rent, so there exists consumers characterized with θ = 1 who
are not buying the good.
In this case, demand writes as DA(p, q) = (1−θ0(0))x
2
, that is:
DA(p, q) =
(
1− p
q
)(
θq−p
t
)
2θL
(4)
2In this setting, assuming the monopoly is located at x = 0 is not restrictive as there is no interaction with
another firm, and due to constant return to scale, location does not matter.
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In regime (B), the consumer (x = 1, θ = 1) enjoys a strictly positive utility. The demand is
thus DB(p, q) = (2−θ0(0)−θ0(1))
2
and can be rewritten:
DB(p, q) =
(
2− p
q
− p+t
q
)
2
(5)
3 The first-best optimum
The First Best quality and price are defined by the maximization of the consumer surplus: as
the rule to achieve a maximal Social Welfare is to set the price to marginal cost, the monopoly
profit is thus zero.
In regime (A), consumer surplus is defined by:
CSA(p, q) =
∫ x(p,q)
0
(∫ θ
θ0(x)
(θq − p− tx)dθ
)
dx =
(q − p)3
6qt
(6)
and its maximization leads to:
pfb−A = c(qfb−A) =
8
25
and qfb−A =
4
5
(7)
For regime (B), the consumer surplus is now defined by:
CSB(p, q) =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
θ0(x)
(θq − p− tx)dθ
)
dx =
3p2 + 3pt+ t2 + 3q(q − 2p− t)
6q
(8)
The computations for first best values are tedious, but there are not needed for the compar-
isons with the quality chosen by the monopoly. Indeed, the index that allows to rank first best
qualities and monopoly qualities only relies on the analytical expression of the social welfare
evaluated with the quality chosen by the monopoly (see next section).
The Social Planner is in regime (A) as long as x(tfb) < 1. Given equation (3) computed
with pfb−A and qfb−A, it leads to t > tfb = 12
25
.
4 The monopoly optimum and comparisons
Due to the definition of the demand in regime A given in equation (4), monopoly profit is
defined by:
piA(p, q) = (p− c(q))DA(p, q) =
(
p− 1
2
q2
) (1− p
q
) (
q−p
t
)
2
(9)
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Maximizing (9) with respect to price3 and quality gives:
pm−A(q) =
q(q + 1)
3
, qm−A =
4
5
, and a profit pim−A =
32
3125t
(10)
Situation (A) is relevant as long as x(tm) ≤ 1, that is: t > tm = 825 (because p > q − t ⇔
t > tm as the price is independent of the transportation cost).
In regime (B), the monopolist maximizes piB(p, q) = (p− c(q))DB(p, q), leading to:
pm−B(q) =
q2 + 2q − t
4
and qm−B =
1 +
√
3t+ 1
3
(11)
This equilibrium achieves a monopoly profit equal to:
pim−B =
(1− 9t) + (3t+ 1) 32
27
(12)
Contrary to the previous regime, the price and the quality of the good do now depend on
the transportation cost. When t increases, it has two effects on the price level. First, it induces
an increase in quality so cost arises and as demand elasticity in price decreases, this leads to an
increase in price. Second, the increase in t makes elasticity in price increase, so the final price
can decrease. Finally, the price increases when the first effect dominates (quality effect) that
is as long as t < 1. But because regime (B) is only relevant for t ∈ [0, 8
25
], the price set by the
monopoly is always increasing in the transportation cost for regime (B).
The quality and price of the good are continuous in t (and so is the profit) between the two
regimes (A and B)4.
Proposition: For any transportation cost, the monopoly chooses a higher or equal quality than
the first best one. Quality chosen is strictly higher for t ∈]0, 12
25
[.
Proof:
To compare the first best qualities with the quality level chosen by the monopolist, we do
not need to compute first best qualities but an index (see below).
As described in Spence (1975), the incentive to distort quality level depends on how the
surplus that the monopoly may appropriate varies with quality. Indeed, two effects must be
3It is interesting to note that as quality is constant, the price is also independent of the transportation cost
t and equal to pm−A = pm−A(qm−A) = 1225 . This comes from the fact that in a such model, elasticity in price or
in quality does not depend on transportation cost.
4The profit is concave in (p, q) in each regime, and differentiable in t = 825 .
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taken into account simultaneously for explaining the monopoly choice in quality: marginal ver-
sus average valuation quality, and incentive to restrict quantities sold.
The average consumer valuation of quality is higher than the marginal consumer one. Com-
puting the inverse demand function for both regimes gives (where Q is the total quantity sold):
pm−A(Q, q) = q −
√
2Qqt and pm−B(Q, q) =
q(1− 2Q)− t
2
Therefore,
∂2pm−A(Q, q)
∂q∂Q
= − t
2
√
2Qqt
< 0 and
∂2pm−B(Q, q)
∂q∂Q
= −1 < 0
Given a total quantity Q, the monopoly has incentive to undersupply quality compared
to the first-best one (like in classic unit demand models of vertical differentiation). But here,
as demand is more elastic because of horizontal differentiation, quantities restrictions must be
taken into account for explaining that the monopoly oversupplies quality.
The analytic expressions of the monopoly and the first best are:
pm−A =
12
25
; qm−A =
4
5
; pfb−A =
8
25
; qfb−A =
4
5
; (13)
and
pm−B =
4− 3t+ 4√1 + 3t
18
; qm−B =
1 +
√
1 + 3t
3
; (14)
When the Social Planner is in regime (A), that is for t > tfb = 12
25
, the monopoly is also
in regime (A) as t > tm =
8
25
. There is no distortion in quality and it is set to qm−A = qfb−A = 4
5
.
When the Social Planner is in regime (B), two cases must be distinguished for the monopoly's
regime5. The monopoly is still in regime (A) for 8
25
< t < 12
25
, and switches for regime (B) when
t < 8
25
. In order to compare qualities in both situations, we follow the method proposed by
Spence (1975) in his Proposition 2 p. 421: the monopoly oversupplies quality when β′(q) > 0
with β(q) = pi
i(p(q),q)
SW i(q)
and i = (A) or (B) for regimes. SW i(q) denotes the Social Welfare, that
is the Consumer Surplus evaluated with a price equal to the unit cost and at the monopoly's
optimum quality.
• When 0 < t < 8
25
, the monopoly and the Social Planner are in regime (B). Monopoly
profit gives: piB(p(q), q) = ((q−2)q+t)
2
16q
and SWB(q) =
3(q−2)2q+6(q−2)t+ 4t2
q
24
. Straightforward
5The Social Planner switches for greater values of t than the monopoly from regime (B) to regime (A). In
regime (A), there is no distortion in quality but the price of the monopoly is higher than the unit cost. So when
t decreases, switching from (A) to (B) occurs for larger values of the transportation cost for the Social Planner.
Quality then vary in regime (B).
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computations lead to:
Sign[β′(q(t))] = Sign[6(q(t)− 1)t2((q(t)− 2)q(t) + t)] (15)
Using (14), the sign of β′(q(t)) is positive for t ∈ [0, 8
25
].The monopoly therefore oversup-
plies quality compared to the Social Planner (excepted in t = 0 where the index β′(q) = 0).
• For 8
25
< t < 12
25
, the monopoly is located in regime (A) whereas the Social Planner is still
in regime (B). Therefore, piA(p(q), q) = − (q−2)3q2
108t
leading to Sign[β′(q(t))]=Sign[−4(q(t)−
2)2(q(t)−1)q(t)2((q(t)−2)q(t)+2t)2]=Sign[192(12−25t)2] by substituting q with qm−B =
4
5
. In this range of transportation costs, the derivative is positive and the monopoly is
still oversupplying quality.
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The monopoly does not distort quality compared to first best as long as t = 0 or t > 12
25
.
In all other configurations, the quantity restrictions because of demand elasticity overrides the
fact that the consumer's average valuation of quality is higher than the marginal one.
5 Conclusion
The result is that under partial market coverage, the monopoly oversupplies quality. This
contrasts with the case of only one differentiation dimension and unit demand models where
the monopoly sets the same quality than the Social Planner or a lower one. When taking into
account the double differentiation demand of consumers, and therefore an always partial market
coverage, we find the monopoly can oversupply quality. The quantity restriction effect leads to
a higher quality supplied, and thus a higher price.
Considering global elastic demands, without multi-unit buying consumers, adds one more
degree of freedom for the demand function inducing a higher global elasticity in price. This
improvement reverses the classical conclusion of unit demand models only differentiated verti-
cally as the monopoly restricts more severely the quantities he sells. He is then obliged to set
a higher quality level than the first best one in order to capture a higher share of the social
surplus.
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